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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to hear
this matter pursuant to Section 78-2A-3(2)(a) of Utah Code Annot.
This is an appeal from the Board of
February 8,

1989, affirming

Review's Decision dated

the decision

Law Judge's (hereinafter "ALJ")

denial

of the Administrative

of

unemployment compen-

sation benefits to appellant.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the Review Board erred in adopting the findings

of the ALJ that appellant had ever asked for a blue slip,
any way

at fault

demonstrated that
futile, or

as to

an incident

an effort

to work

on February
out the

was in

12, 1988, had

problems would be

whether appellant was presented with any real options

on June 22, 1988.
II.
denial of

Whether the Review

Board

erred

in

holding

that the

unemployment insurance benefits to appellant would not

be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness under the law.
III. Whether the decision of the Board of Review in ignoring
a substantial

part of

the record evidence before it is contrary

to the decision of the Utah Supreme Court

in Covington

v. Board

of Review, 737 P.2d 207 (Utah 1987).
IV.
the

Whether the

motives

of

Review Board

appellant's

erred in failing to consider

employer,

or

appellant's

health

reasons in connection with appellant's termination from her work.
1

V.

Whether the

Review Board

failed to properly interpret

and apply Section 35-4-5 (a), (b) and (c) of the

Utah Employment

Security Act.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's

interpretation of the application of Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-4-5 (a), (b)
circumstances

of

this

matter,

and
is

(c), to

the

controlling

facts and

as

to whether

appellant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
of the

applicable provisions

A copy

of such statute is attached hereto

in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal
Employment

from

Security,

a

decision

dated

August

unemployment benefits to appellant
July

10,

1988,

and

continuing

5,

Sharon

unemployment insurance

Th€>
1988,

H.

a

hearing

before

good

Judge Love

affirmed the

cause

the Board

of

Review

and

that a

W.

Section 35-4-5.

Love,

on September

ALJ

6 and

for

the

13, 1988,

Department representative's decision to

deny appellant unemployment
dated November 18, 1988.

denied

benefits would not be contrary

Christopher

Department of Employment Security

which

Merriam effective

to equity and good conscience pursuant to U.C.A.
After

Department of

thereafter, on the grounds the

appellant left work voluntarily without
denial of

by

compensation

benefits

in

an order

Following a timely appeal by appellant,

affirmed

Judge
2

Love's

conclusions

in a

Decision

dated

February

8,

1989,

Petition for Writ of Review and
Court of

Appeals, arguing

objectionable in

the

Appellant

timely filed a

Docketing Statement

in the Utah

the same points which appellant found

decision

of

the

ALJ,

which

issues are

presented above.

Statement of Facts.
The facts

of this

are as follows ("R."
1.

case pertinent to the defendant's appeal

stands for "Record"):

Sharon H. Merriam (hereinafter

"Sharon") began working

at Nordstroms on February 5, 1982, at the wage of about $4.25 per
hour.

R. at 57, 64.
2.

in

wage

After several months, Sharon
and

responsibility,

and

began receiving increases

continued

to do so until it

became $8.40 per hour as a lead on the processing
February, 1988.
3.

R. at 64, 70.

Accidents

at

the

workplace

caused

workers compensation claims to the Industrial
for work-related
while she

floor prior to

injuries to

was employed

Sharon

to

make

Commission of Utah

her lower back, right arm and neck

at Nordstroms,

a self-insured employer.

R. at 34, 65 and 66.
4.

After informing

in late November, 1987

her employer of back surgery scheduled

to repair

a hernia

of vertebrae

in the

lower back, Sharon experienced verbal confrontations with a black
employee during and at her employment.
5.

R. at 242, 254, and 60.

Despite her excellent attendance
3

at work,

both Sharon

and

the

black

co-worker

were

placed

on

a

60 day probation

because, Sharon was told, Nordstroms was having problems with the
NAACP in

Seattle, Washington

and her punishment had to be equal

to that of the black employee.
6.

R. at 85, 86, 60 and 61.

Immediately thereafter, at least

a conference
Sharon.

eight co-workers held

with Nordstroms management as a show of support for

R. at 141.

7.

At least one co-worker,

got along with everyone.
8.

After

12, 1988

felt that Sharon

R. at 140.

several

lower back for a

Brenda Eyer,

weeks

off

work to have surgery on her

work-related ruptured

Sharon's manager

disk, on

and ticket

about February

maker were both given the

day off, causing much distress to the new ticket maker.
9.

Rather than

February 12,
chose

to

Maria

believe

believe Sharon's
McArdle,

an

the

employee

removed Sharon from her job

as

a

version of the events of

Distribution
not

R. at 68

Center manager,

even at work that day, and

lead

supervisor,

claims position as the only alternative for Sharon.

offering a
R. at 69 and

303, paragraphs 4 and 5.
10.

Sharon was not able

claims, inasmuch

to use

her supervisory

skills in

as she was the only employee in the department.

R. at 70.
11.
that she

Sharon found
had lost

out only

her six

after her

"transfer" to claims

years of seniority on the processing

floor, her hours would be reduced due to the lack
claims versus

the floor

of overtime in

generally, and that her salary would be
4

reduced from $8,40 to $7.80 per hour.

R. at

70, 71,

91, 92 and

257.
12.

Upon

beginning

work

in

claims, Sharon was shown old

work needing filing, claim transfers dating
1988, and

January 18,

was told by the outgoing employee that no one keeps up

in claims.
13.
pounds

back to

R. at 199, 105 and 106.
Despite the fact that boxes weighing

were

sometimes

required

to

an average

of 40

be lifted by Sharon in the

claims department, Sharon was told by Ms. McArdle that if she had
to take

any time off work from claims due to "any physical thing

that happened", she would be dismissed

or replaced.

R.

at 74,

88, 214, and 33.
14.

Not

long

after

March 4, 1988, Sharon
right

arm,

but

commencing

experienced a

returned

to

work

continued pain for fear of her job.
15.

After continued

caught up

in claims,

work

in claims, on about

work-related injury
almost

immediately despite

R. at 331, 114, and 115.

excellent attendance

Sharon was

to her

and almost being

told on June 10, 1988 that she

was being put on a 30 day probationary period and that if she was
not caught

up in

would be fired.
16.
several

claims at

the end

R. at 85, 86, 192 and 205.

During April, May and
providers

of

directly related to the
November 1987

of this 30 day period, she

June, Sharon

medical

services

medical

surgery, a

services

for

was being

sued by

overdue

accounts

involved

in Sharon's

January 1987 accident at work, and her

March 1988 injury to her right arm, each of which
5

Nordstroms had

refused to pay and only began its inquiry into the claims in May,
1988,

R. at 16, 268 and 269.
17.

After

assistance

being

threatened

her

supervisor,

from

with

dismissal,

getting

no

Carol Kelly, despite repeated

requests for help, discovering that her files were being reviewed
only in

her absence, and not being given any real options due to

her handicaps and the drastic pay and hours
such "options",
job.

Sharon began

cuts associated with

to desperately

search for another

R. at 87, 90, 91, 271 and 33.
18.

On June 24, after two days

working on

of several

other employees

Sharon's claim transfers without Sharon's being asked

or even made privy to such work, Sharon was not

allowed to begin

work despite the fact that on June 24, other management employees
were allowed to work on Sharon's work-in-process.
19.

Upon

arriving

to

work

on

June

immediately met with accusations of lying,
Sharon that

27,

it was

Sharon

was

very clear to

she would lose her job in 30 days, i.e., July 10, so

she acquiesced and quit.
20.

R. at 90, 208.

The

ALJ

found

R. at 90, 91.
in

favor

of

the

respondents, which

decision was affirmed with little comment by the Review Board.
Sharon now appeals the decision of the Board of Review.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Good cause

for the appellant's having terminated employment

with Nordstroms on June 27, 1988
had already

experienced one

is established.

severe shift
6

The appellant

in duties wherein her

prior expertise was ignored, and her pay and hours reduced.
combined

with

appellant's

This

serious health limitations urge this

Court to find good cause existed for appellant's having to quit.
Further,
market and

appellant's

continued

her reasonable

attachments

to

the labor

actions under the circumstances allow

the Court to award benefits to

appellant consistent

with equity

and good conscience, and public policies.

ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT RESIGNED WITH GOOD CAUSE.
The first

and third

addressed here.
of consideration

issues presented on appeal can both be

U.C.A. Section 35-4-5 A. requires

two standards

following voluntary separation from employment,

one of which is "good cause".

Pursuant

to Section

35-4-5 B.I.,

good cause is established "if continuance of the employment would
have had an adverse
controlled or

effect on

prevented and

the claimant

which could

necessitated immediate severance of

the employment relationship, or if the work was . .
new work."

Subsection

the claimant "must have
made continuance

of the

B.l.a. states
been

. unsuitable

that an adverse effect on

motivated

by

circumstances which

employment a hardship or matter of real

concern sufficiently adverse . . .

to outweigh

remaining

be

employed.

not be

There

must

potential physical, mental, economic,

a

the benefits of

showing

[or] personal

of actual or
. .

. harm

caused or aggravated by continuance in the employment."
The Utah Supreme Court, in Covington v. Board of Review, 737
7

P.2d 207 (Utah 1987), found such
employee for

good

cause

Sharon Merriam

was harassed

to maintain

her

record

spotless

off

appears

for
to

After two

where an

employment
for

an

have

Similarly, appellant

and hounded despite a determination
with
more

Nordstroms.
than

five

excepting work-related accidents, until
time

quit

whom a proposed shift in her duties boded a loss of

expertise and a concomitant loss of income.

was

to

in

Her employment

and one-half years,
November,

1987 more

alleged consequence of an industrial accident
changed

Nordstrom's

probationary periods

attitude?

toward Sharon.

in less than six months of work,

Sharon was looking at her only options being in claims, where she
already knew

the work to be overly strenuous for her lifting and

writing capacities by
Lemond

was

absent

doctor's
on

request

several

(particularly

when Bob

Mondays), or as a receptionist,

which job was to have severely cut hours of work,,

lower pay, and

appellant's acceptance of such would necessarily require that her
daughter-in-law be dismissed.
If Nordstroms wanted to
could

have

offered

processing floor.
ever

offered

her

option

provide

one

Appellant

the

R. at 249, 250.

of

full-time

work

for

six

of

to

appellant, it

light-duty

vigorously

disputes

jewelry;

acknowledged by Nordstroms that
than

options

jewelry

appellant.

jobs
that

nevertheless,
would

have

she was
it

is

meant less

R. at 264.

Appellant's

at $8.40

per hour to

income dropped from over 40 hours per week
around 35 hours per week at $7.80 per hour.

This is exactly what

the Supreme Court had in mind in Covington, supra, when
8

on the

it found

the loss of income unacceptable.
The

other

element

of

appellant stated that her
lead

during

some

six

supervisory
years

either jewelry, claims, or
would be

Covington

is

present

abilities

here:

acquired

as a

of experience would be useless in

as

a

completely ignored.

receptionist.

And
of

Nordstrom's

parallels

also

Her expertise

to have consistently ignored

appellant's testimony in favor
management

also

the

interested
the

testimony of

potential

abuses

checked by the Court in Covington.
Finally, consistent with Denby v. Board of Review,
626 (Utah

1977), the

increasing

handicaps

567 P.2d

external pressures on appellant, i.e., her
as

to

her

ability

to

accept

a claims

position in claims in the first place and/or to remain in claims,
were so compelling
common

sense

that

would

be

a

prudent

justified

person
in

exercising ordinary

quitting

under

similar

circumstances.

Despite seeking for other employment, appellant's

handicaps made

it necessary

for

for her

serious

consideration

at

appellant is

physically or

emotionally unable to continue work,

she need only

offer

reasons existed

other

to gloss over her injuries

competent

to justify

employment.

testimony

her quitting.

that

nor

the

Board

of

Review

questioned

the

adequate health

See, Box Elder County

v. Industrial Commission, 632 P.2d 839 (Utah 1981).
ALJ

Where

the

Neither the
seriousness of

appellant's injuries to her right arm and lower back, and in fact
acknowledged that
existed.

some limitation of appellant's work activities

R. at 33.
9

As an end result of such handicaps, appellant
without ability
qualified.
is good

to do

many jobs

she might

has been left

otherwise have been

Public policy requires that an interpretation of what

cause should include providing benefits for appellant in

such circumstances.

II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SUGGEST THAT EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
REQUIRE THAT APPELLANT RECEIVE BENEFITS
This is a case where, should
appellant did

the Court

decide that somehow

not have the requisite "good cause" to voluntarily

terminate her employment, another possibility exists
an award
where

of benefits

there

are

conscience may
acted

mitigating

[and]

continued attachment

to the

Utah

decisions to

.

.

the

claimant

labor market.

P.2d

Court

in

the

persons squeezed

1312

(Utah

anticipated
final

demonstrated a

The ALJ found that,

1982),

out of

the

employment situation

10

importance

of

of benefits

employment, and stated in
of Employment Security,

commission must consider the

before bestowing

equity and good conscience.

the

determination

reasonableness of the claimant's actions and
of the

good

demonstrated continued attachments

Salt Lake City Corporation \. Department
657

and

R. at 291.

Supreme

unfairness and equity

equity

of benefits if . , . "the claimant

appellant herein

to the labor market.
The

.

Section 35-4-5 A. and C.,

circumstances,

allow payment

reasonably;

indeed, the

might be based.

under which

assess the totality
benefits based on

In the instant matter, many facts alone are being ignored as
irrelevant

in

facts taken
action on

the

ALJ

and

Review Board decisions.

together constitute
June 27,

1988 was

circumstances where appellant's

reasonable.

Appellant was ignored

when she requested assistance, even after being put
in

June,

1988;

appellant

was

on probation

not pounding fists on the desk;

appellant did not ask to be fired; appellant
in her

But these

had done

very well

relationships with co-workers; appellant was not informed

of the consequences of her accepting new work in March, 1988 just
prior to

being terminated,

hours decreased, etc.;

such as

appellant

loss of seniority, pay cut,

was

not

informed

as

to why

others were enlisted to do her work, or even given an opportunity
to try to catch up on her work
probation

period;

to free

appellant's

requests

herself from
for

the 30-day

light

work

were

answered only by a refusal to allow her to work on the processing
floor again, despite at least six jobs on the floor, one of which
Nordstroms says it offered appellant (albeit with drastically cut
hours); and
the same

finally, being

day

that

someone

forced to take a day off on June 24,
else

spent

8

hours

pouring over

appellant's desk doing her work.
The above

facts taken together make appellant's reaction to

false charges of lies and criticisms
very

reasonable

continuing
something to

and

relationship

prudent.
to

the

on the
Appellant

labor

morning of
had

market,

June 27

maintained
and

a

expected

come around shortly, where her skills and expertise

could again be useful.

Equity and good conscience strongly favor
11

the appellant in this case.
Appellant urges
that,

in

reviewing

Oklahoma, Nevada,
filing

the Court

a

the

unconscionable

facts

Oregon and

workmen's
act

to go
of

one step further and find
this

case,

in

Utah, like

Indiana, retaliatory discharge for

compensation

actionable

in

claim
a

is

a

Court of law.

wrongful,
See, e.g.,

Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988), Brown
v. Transcom

Lines, 284

Or 597,

588 P.2d

1087 (1978), Hansen v.

Harrahs', 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).

CONCLUSION
Appellant has found herself in extreme hardships due
refusal

of

her

former

employer Nordstroms to pay back medical

bills, and the refusal of
worker's compensation

State

assistance

is pending.

Where

possibility to work at

menial labor

the

her

circumstances

of

to the

where

a

claim for

appellant has no real

jobs due

to her handicaps,

having to leave employment where she

consistently was one of the first to arrive and the last to leave
are extremely

important.

Appellant is alone in her petitions to

this Court, and has no way of funding the same.

She

pleads that

this Court will give proper weight to her testimony and find that
the situation at Nordstroms generated a voluntary quit
cause

or,

in

the

with good

alternative, that equity and good conscience

require that appellant receive unemployment insurance benefits.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

12

f ^S^day of

J u ^ g,

1988.

DWIGHT EPPERSON, Attorney for
Appellant Sharon H. Merriam
36 South State St., Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 322-5062
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I
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foregoing Brief of Appellant
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Winston M. Faux
Special Assistant
Attorney General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
1234 South Main Street
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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ADDENDUM

U.C.A. S e c t i o n 35-1+-5
A, The Act requires two standards of consideration following
a voluntary separation from employment: good cause and equity
and_good conscience. If the claimant fails to establish good
cause for leaving work, unemployment insurance benefits will
not be denied if a denial of benefits would be contrary to the
equity and good conscience standard.
B. 1. Good cause is established if continuance of the employment would have had an adverse effect on the claimant which
could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated immediate
severance of the employment relationship, o n if the work was .
illegal, or unsuitable new work.
B. 1. a.

Adverse Effect on the Claimant

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances which
made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of real
concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh
the benefits of remaining employed. There must be a showing
of actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or
professional harm caused or aggravated by continuance in the
employment. The claimant's reason(s) for belief of the consequences of remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary;
substantial, not trifling. These circumstances must be applied
as to the average individual, not the supersensitive.
B. 1. b. Ability to Control or Prevent
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the
claimant good cause is not established if the claimant:
(1) reasonably could have continued working
other employment, or

while looking for

(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible for him to preserve his job through approved leave,
transfer, or adjustment to personal circumstances, etc., or,
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circumstances
causing the hardship so the employer would have an opportunity
to make adjustments which would alleviate the need to quit. An
employee with grievances about his employment must show an
effort to work out the problems with the employer unless such
efforts would be futile.
C.

Equity and Good Conscience

1. When the circumstances of the quit were not sufficiently
compelling to justify an allowance of benefits for good cause,
but there were mitigating circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness,
benefits may be allowed under the provisions of equity and good
conscience if: • • . the claimant acted reasonably; . . . the
claimant demonstrated a continued attachment to the labor
market.

